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ABSTRACT  
   
Although recent research has suggested that motivations such as disease 
avoidance and self-protection are associated with increased social conservatism, less is 
known about the impact of other fundamental motivations on political attitudes. This is 
particularly important given that the currently studied motivations do not consistently 
push around economic attitudes, which are an important determinant of voting. The 
current study investigated the impact of a different motivation, status desire, on both 
economic and social attitudes in a sample of undergraduate students at a large 
southwestern university. Participants first reported their overall, economic, and social 
ideology one month before participating in a lab study. Then, in the lab, they were 
presented either with a vignette designed to elicit status desire, or a closely matched 
control, before responding to a series of items about economic and social political 
attitudes. It was predicted that economic conservatives and liberals in the status desire 
condition would report more economically conservative attitudes relative to their 
counterparts in the control condition. By contrast, it was predicted that social 
conservatives in the status desire condition would report more socially conservative 
attitudes, whereas social liberals in the status desire condition would report more socially 
liberal attitudes, relative to their counterparts in the control condition. However, the use 
of hierarchical linear regressions showed no significant effects of motive activation 
condition, or interactions of motive activation condition with relevant pre-screen political 
ideology, in predicting either economic or social political attitudes. Implications of these 
results for future research are discussed.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Political attitudes are one’s opinions about politically relevant issues and 
phenomena. Such attitudes are important to understand because they reflect opinions 
about a diversity of important life domains (such as economic and social domains), and 
because they are associated with behaviors such as how people vote (Pew Research 
Center, 2016) and even where they choose to live (Motyl, Iyer, Oishi, Trawalter, & 
Nosek, 2014; Bishop, 2009). In short, political attitudes are important because they can 
help shape the rules and membership of a given community or society.  
Whereas prior work has considered the long-term determinants of political 
attitudes, more recent work has focused on how in-the-moment motivations, such as self-
protection and disease avoidance, can influence political attitudes. However, such 
motivations have primarily been successful in shifting social attitudes. The present 
project explores how a different motivation, status desire, might influence political 
attitudes both economic and social.  
The Structure of Political Attitudes 
 
Political attitudes have typically been measured in one of two ways. First, 
researchers interested in an opinion on a specific policy issue may ask one or more items 
about that particular issue, either at one point in time or across decades. For example, 
Pew researchers have measured support for marijuana legalization since the 1960s using 
a single, dichotomous item, “Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal, or 
not” (Geiger, 2018). By contrast, researchers interested in examining multiple political 
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attitudes at once—as we are here—tend to focus on measures of overall political ideology, 
which refers to an interconnected set of political attitudes (Carmines & D’Amico, 2015). 
Such ideology is typically measured in the form of a single item, in which respondents 
must place themselves on a 7 or 9-point overall left-right (liberal-conservative) scale. 
However, such measures have had difficulty differentiating among persons who hold 
moderate or complex political opinions. For example, such single item measures of 
ideology struggle to distinguish between ideological libertarians, who are economically 
conservative but socially liberal, and populists, who are economically liberal, but socially 
conservative (Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Carmines & D’Amico, 2015). 
Accordingly, one of the most popular solutions to this measurement problem has 
been to distinguish between economic and social dimensions of political attitudes 
(Carmines, Ensley, & Wagner, 2012; Carmines & D’Amico, 2015). In this approach, the 
economic dimension of political attitudes concerns how the government should regulate 
and allocate economic resources, such as who should be taxed, at what rate, and for what 
those taxes should be used. By contrast, the social dimension of political attitudes 
concerns how the government should regulate moral and sexual issues, such as same-sex 
marriage and abortion (Carmines & D’Amico, 2015). Notably, this two-dimensional 
structure of political ideology has been verified using factor analytic approaches in large, 
nationally representative attitude survey data sets (Feldman & Johnston, 2014; Carmines 
et al., 2012). Thus, social and economic attitudes can be a useful and generalizable way 
of summarizing political attitudes. 
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Motivation and the Malleability of Political Attitudes 
 
Prior research suggests that political attitudes are relatively stable across the life-
span. Longitudinal studies, for example, indicate the relative stability of political attitudes 
throughout adulthood (Alwin, Cohen, & Newcomb, 1991; Sears & Funk, 1999), and 
traditional models in political science suggest that early socialization (such as from 
parents) plays a large role in shaping these attitudes (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & 
Stokes, 1960). Political attitudes also appear to be heritable. For example, studies of 
attitudes among monozygotic and heterozygotic twins suggest that approximately 40-
60% of individual differences in political attitudes are attributable to genetic influences, 
although the exact amount varies somewhat by issue (Hatemi & McDermott, 2012). 
Collectively, this suggests that people have relatively stable political attitudes over time.  
However, political attitudes can also be moved around in the moment. This is an 
idea consistent with the argument that political attitudes are a type of motivated social 
cognition. In other words, although people generally have a certain set point in terms of 
their political attitudes, different political attitudes can be useful for fulfilling different 
kinds of goals and motivations (Jost, Glaser, Kuglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). Recently, 
two different motivations, those related to self-protection and disease avoidance, have 
been shown to influence political attitudes at both trait and state levels.  
Self-Protection Motivation. Much research suggests that political conservatism 
is associated with greater self-protection concern at the trait level. For instance, 
conservatives are both more likely to view the world as a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 
1998), and to fear terrorism, crime, and death (Jost, 2006; Jost, Glaser, Kuglanski, & 
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Sulloway, 2003). In this respect, conservatives may be chronically motivated to hold 
political attitudes than can keep them safe from potentially dangerous others.  
Conservative political attitudes can also be triggered in the case of more 
immediate self-protection concerns. For example, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, both 
liberals and conservatives became more politically conservative (Nail & McGregor, 
2009), highlighting the real-world ramifications of self-protection related stimuli. Self-
protection-related threats have also been found to influence political attitudes in more 
controlled settings. For instance, simply reminding participants about death in the lab, by 
asking them to write about how they feel about their own death and about what they think 
will happen when they die, led liberal participants to report more conservative attitudes 
about abortion, the death penalty, and health benefits for gay couples (Nail, McGregor, 
Drinkwater, Steele, & Thompson, 2009). In a different study, conservative and liberal 
participants read vignettes which endowed them with one of two superpowers, either the 
ability to fly, or the ability to be impervious to harm. After reading the vignette in which 
they were impervious to harm, conservatives reported being more socially (but not 
economically) liberal (Napier, Huang, Vonasch, & Bargh, 2018). Accordingly, it seems 
that the presence (or in some cases, absence) of self-protection motivations have an 
influence on social political attitudes. 
 Disease Avoidance Motivation. A recent meta-analysis of 24 studies has 
suggested the existence of a reliable link between trait-level disease avoidance motivation 
and conservative social attitudes (Terizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013). This work 
postulates the existence of a set of psychological mechanisms known as a “behavioral 
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immune system.” These mechanisms include disgust sensitivity and fear of 
contamination, and help people avoid potentially hazardous pathogens. One way they 
may do so is through their association with conservative social attitudes, such as less 
welcoming attitudes toward outgroups who might carry unfamiliar illnesses (such as 
immigrants or gay men).  
Similarly, more state-level disease-avoidance stimuli have also been shown to 
influence political attitudes. For example, one study found that women in their first 
trimester of pregnancy— a time in which fetuses are particularly vulnerable to pathogens, 
and thus in which pregnant women have particularly heightened disgust responses—
reported significantly more negative attitudes toward a foreigner relative to women at 
other (less disgust-sensitive) points in their pregnancy (Navarette, Fessler, & Eng, 2007). 
Notably, such an attitude is consistent with the socially conservative position of less 
support for immigration. Laboratory studies have also managed to influence political 
attitudes with various disgust/disease-related stimuli. For example, in one study, 
reminders of physical cleanliness (such as the mention of a hand sanitizer dispenser in the 
hallway) led participants to self-report being more conservative (Helzer & Pizarro, 2011). 
Similarly, the presence of a foul odor (versus no odor) led both liberal and conservative 
participants to report less positive feelings toward gay men (Inbar, Pizarro, & Bloom, 
2012). Thus, it seems that disease avoidance motivations can similarly encourage more 
socially conservative political attitudes.  
Notably, both self-protection and disease-related stimuli have been reliably 
successful at influencing social, but not necessarily economic, political attitudes (e.g., 
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Napier, Huang, Vonasch, & Bargh, 2018; Terizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013). This 
makes sense when we consider what self-protection and disease avoidance motivations 
are designed to do. Because these motivations protect us from potentially dangerous 
others (either in terms of harm or pathogens), they should primarily influence attitudes 
that are directly linked to our contact with, and behavior of, other people (such as 
immigrants and gay men). By contrast, self-protection and disgust may have less to do 
with economic attitudes, which are associated with resources and how they are allocated 
in a society and are thus less directly related to our contact with others.  
Although the lack of impact of these motivations on economic issues is 
understandable, this leaves important unanswered questions about what motivations are 
related to economic issues, which reflect an important aspect of politics. Indeed, a recent 
report from Pew Research Center indicated that “the economy” was the issue that was 
most frequently considered “very important” to registered voters’ votes in the 2016 
election, making it the top issue in that election (Pew Research Center, 2016). 
Accordingly, it seems important to consider what kinds of motivations might influence 
economic political attitudes in the moment, as repeated activation of these motives over 
time may contribute to longer-term differences in economic attitudes. Desire for status 
represents one potentially important motive related to economic attitudes.  
Status Motivation and Political Attitudes 
 
The desire for status can be thought of as a fundamental human motivation that 
involves the desire to earn the admiration, voluntary deference, and respect of other 
people (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). Those who desire status typically pursue 
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it through display of valuable traits or resources (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). 
For example, one study examined the correlates of status among MBA students at their 
jobs, a context in which the ability to offer help was highly valued. Those students who 
were high self-monitors (and thus particularly attuned to social status) were more likely 
to be reported as generous with their time and advice to coworkers, which in turn lead to 
increased social status in a mediation analysis. This suggests that those who desire status 
attempt to display the social traits that are desirable in a given context (Flynn, Reagans, 
Amanatullah, & Ames, 2006). 
Similarly, status is associated with displays of wealth, such as a preference for 
expensive and luxurious objects (Anderson, Hildreth, & Howland, 2015). For example, in 
one study, participants who imagined competing for a promotion (and thus experienced 
more status desire) were more likely to choose an expensive (versus an inexpensive) 
environmentally friendly product, relative to participants who imagined losing concert 
tickets (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010). By contrast, participants in the 
concert ticket control condition preferred the less expensive environmentally friendly 
product. This suggests that status desire may attune people toward wanting to display the 
trappings of status, in the form of valuable goods.  
These two aspects of status desire—its influence on the desire for valuable goods 
and socially relevant desirable traits— may have important implications for economic 
and social political attitudes. 
Status Motivation and Economic Attitudes. Economic attitudes primarily range 
in the extent to which people believe that the government should stay out of economic 
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affairs (on the conservative end of the spectrum) or regulate the economy to redistribute 
resources across society (on the liberal end of the spectrum). Accordingly, liberal 
economic attitudes imply the possibility that one’s economic resources could be forcibly 
reallocated elsewhere. Such a possibility poses a potential challenge to one’s ability to 
attain valuable goods. Therefore, because status desire leads people to prefer more 
valuable goods (Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010), both liberals and 
conservatives with increased status desire may view liberal economic attitudes as a threat 
to fulfilling this preference. Thus, when motivated by status desire, both liberals and 
conservatives may instead endorse more economically conservative attitudes. 
Status Motivation and Social Attitudes. Social attitudes range in the extent to 
which people believe that the government should regulate certain social and moral 
behaviors (on the conservative end of the spectrum) or let individuals decide how to 
behave socially and morally (on the liberal end of the spectrum). Because status desire 
leads people to try to display socially relevant desirable traits, it may be that status desire 
leads conservatives and liberals to emphasize different kinds of traits that are valuable to 
their respective political ingroups. Whereas conservatives may especially emphasize the 
importance of regulating certain social and moral behaviors (i.e., endorse more social 
conservativism) when motivated by status desire, liberals may especially emphasize the 
importance of individual liberties related to social and moral behaviors (i.e., endorse 
more social liberalism) when motivated by status desire.  
Importantly, social attitudes invoke certain moral values without directly 
influencing one’s economic resources or potential purchasing power. This suggests that 
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social attitudes may serve as a relatively unencumbered signal of certain moral 
viewpoints. Unlike in the case of economic attitudes, it is possible to have the “right” 
attitudes about social issues (such as abortion) without having a direct implication on 
one’s economic resources. So, whereas status desire may lead conservatives and liberals 
alike to have more conservative economic attitudes, it seems probable that status desire 
will lead conservatives and liberals to polarize on their social attitudes. 
However, it is also possible that some groups may be especially sensitive to status 
desire. For example, prior work has suggested that individuals with higher status may be 
more reactive to status threats (Gruenewald, Kemeny, & Aziz, 2006; Anderson, Hildreth, 
& Howland, 2015). Thus, it is possible that higher status individuals may be especially 
responsive to status desire both in terms of their economic and social attitudes. 
Accordingly, it is important to control for status-relevant traits, such as socioeconomic 
status, to help isolate whether the effects are due to status desire or to other confounds. 
The Present Study 
 
Hypotheses. The above evidence suggests two hypotheses about the impact of a 
status desire motive on economic and social political attitudes: 
1.) Relative to a control condition, a status desire motive will lead both economic 
conservatives and economic liberals to endorse more politically conservative 
economic attitudes. 
2.) Relative to a control condition, a status desire motive will lead social 
conservatives and social liberals to double-down (become more extreme in 
their ideology) on social attitudes. 
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 To test these two hypotheses, as prior work has done with disease and self-
protection related concerns, I experimentally activate a status desire motive (relative to a 
matched control condition) and measure its impact on both social and economic attitudes 
among conservatives and liberals. Under this paradigm, hypothesis 1 would be supported 
by the presence of a main effect of motive activation condition on economic attitudes, 
whereby being in the status desire condition (vs. the control condition) makes people 
more economically conservative in the main study relative to their economic ideological 
stance in the prescreen. Hypothesis 2 would be supported by the presence of an 
interaction between motive activation condition and pre-screen ideology when predicting 
social attitudes, such that those in the status condition would report more extreme social 
attitudes relative to their social ideological stance in the prescreen. Specifically, those 
who identified as socially conservative (right of center) in the pre-screen would be 
expected to show more greatly increased conservatism on social issues in the status 
condition than the control; and participants who identified as socially liberal (left of 
center) in the pre-screen would show a greater move toward the liberal extreme on social 
attitudes in the status condition than in the control.  





We recruited 395 participants for our preliminary analysis. After deleting 
participants who did not complete the pre-screen measure or pass our attention and 
manipulation check,1 we were left with a final sample size of n = 211. Although our 
initial aim was to collect N=255, which would have given us 90% power to detect effects, 
our final N provided 84% power to detect increases in R² = .04 (between a small and 
medium effect) associated with the tested predictor (either a single variable or an 
interaction term), assuming α = .05 and 6 total predictors. This post-hoc power analysis 
was conducted in GPower – Linear multiple regression for a fixed model.  
Participants were psychology undergraduate students from a large southwestern 
university who earned half a credit toward a class requirement for participating. This 
undergraduate convenience sample was used for two reasons. First, prior research has 
successfully activated status desire among undergraduate students (Griskevicius et al., 
2009; Griskevicius, Tybur, & Van den Bergh, 2010). Second, our sample yielded a 
diverse set of pre-screen political ideologies2, suggesting the suitability of this group for 
studying political attitudes.  
                                                 
1 Specifically, data from 169 participants were excluded because they did not complete the pre-screen, data 
from 5 participants were excluded because they took the pre-screen but did not complete our political 
ideology measures, data from 1 participant was excluded because they did not pass the attention check, and 
data from an additional 9 participants were excluded because they did not correctly pass the motive 
activation manipulation check.  
2 Among our 211 participants in the main study, in terms of overall pre-screen political ideology, 28.4% 
reported being ideologically neutral (moderate), 25.6% reported being slightly to strongly conservative, and 
46.0% reported being slightly to strongly liberal in the pre-screen. In terms of their pre-screen economic 
political ideology, 29.4% reported being ideologically neutral (moderate), 37.0% reported being slightly to 
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Procedure 
 
Psychology 101 students who completed a political ideology pre-screen one 
month before the study were recruited for a lab study on “memory and personality.” In 
the lab, they were presented with one of two motive activation vignettes on a computer 
screen which they were told they would be asked about later. Then, they were asked 
questions about school, their social and economic political attitudes, and their political 
ideology. They were also asked some additional demographic measures, and what they 
thought the purpose of the study was, before they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.  
Materials and Measures 
 
Relevant Pre-Screen Political Ideology. Approximately one month before 
participation in the study, participants responded to three relatively standard items 
measuring political ideology. These items were included as part of a large pre-screen 
survey that was taken by all potential participants, and read as follows: “Which of the 
following best describes your overall political ideology or leaning?”, “How 
conservative/liberal would you consider yourself in terms of economic issues?”, and 
“How conservative/liberal would you consider yourself in terms of social issues?”, 
measured on a 7-point scale (1=Strongly Conservative to 7= Strongly Liberal). Although 
these items showed good internal consistency (α = 0.89), the most relevant item for each 
dependent variable was used as a potential moderator in our analyses—pre-screen social 
                                                                                                                                                 
strongly conservative, and 33.6% reported being slightly to strongly liberal in the pre-screen. And, in terms 
of their pre-screen social political ideology, 23.7% reported being ideologically neutral (moderate), 20.9% 
reported being slightly to strongly conservative, and 55.5% reported being slightly to strongly liberal in the 
pre-screen.  
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ideology was used in analyses about social attitudes, and pre-screen economic ideology 
was used in analyses about economic attitudes. 
Motive Activation Vignettes. Consistent with prior research, participants were 
assigned to read one of two short vignettes—one designed to elicit a desire for status, or a 
closely matched control (See Appendix A). Each vignette was approximately 480 words 
in length. In the status desire vignette, participants were asked to imagine competing with 
two same-sex individuals for a promotion at a large company in a prestigious 
environment (adapted from Griskevicius et al., 2009). In the matched control vignette, 
participants were asked to imagine their first day at new company, where they were given 
a tour of the office by a receptionist.  
Political Attitude Measurements. 
Economic Attitudes. Economic attitudes were measured using four bi-polar 5-
point scale items intended to cover a range of different economic policy issues: the 
minimum wage, tax rates for the wealthy, government health care, and aid to the poor 
(see Appendix A for all item wording). Each of the items began with the prompt: “People 
have varying opinions on/about (issue). Please indicate which of the following best 
reflects your opinion,” and asked participants to select from a range of policy stances, 
presented horizontally. For example, “People have varying opinions about the extent to 
which the government should provide financial assistance to people falling below the 
poverty line. Please indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion: How much 
financial assistance should the government provide to people falling below the poverty 
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line?” (1= “None”, 2= “Minimal”, 3= “Some”, 4= “A lot”, 5= “As much as possible”). 
All responses were coded so that higher values indicated more liberal economic positions.  
Although these four economic attitude items did not quite meet standard cut-offs 
for internal consistency (α = 0.66), they still showed higher internal consistency than our 
other option for measuring economic attitudes using specific economic policy issues: the 
two economic attitude items (“How much financial assistance should the government 
provide to people falling below the poverty line?” and “Who should provide healthcare 
coverage?”, α = 0.58) that correlated most highly with self-reported economic ideology in 
the lab study (rAid = 0.42, p < .001 and rHealthcare = 0.48, p < .001), and with each other (r 
= 0.41, p <.001). Accordingly, the mean composite of the four economic attitude 
questions served as a primary dependent variable of interest. 
Social Attitudes. Social attitudes were also measured using four bi-polar 5-point 
scale items intended to cover a range of different social policy issues: abortion, LGBT 
adoption rights, birth control for minors, and legalizing marijuana (see Appendix A for all 
item wording). Each of the items began with the prompt: “People have varying opinions 
on/about (issue). Please indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion,” and 
asked participants to select from a range of policy stances, presented horizontally. For 
example, “People have varying opinions about the circumstances under which abortion 
should be legal. Please indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion: When 
should abortion be legal?” (1= “Never”, 2= “Rarely”, 3= “Sometimes”, 4= “Most of the 
time”, 5= “Always”). All responses were coded so that higher values indicated more 
liberal social positions.  
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Although these four social attitude items did not quite meet standard cut-offs for 
internal consistency (α = 0.64), they still showed higher internal consistency than our 
other option for measuring social attitudes using specific social policy issues: the two 
social attitude items (“When should abortion be legal?” and “When should gay/lesbian 
couples be allowed to adopt children?”, α = 0.36) that correlated most highly with self-
reported social ideology in the lab study (rAbortion = 0.51, p < .001 and rLGBTrights = 0.33, p 
< .001), and with each other (r = 0.24, p <.001). Accordingly, the mean composite of the 
four social attitude questions served as the other primary dependent variable in our 
analyses. 
Additional Measures. Participants were also asked some questions about their 
personality, and status-relevant demographic questions, including gender, race, age, and 
socioeconomic status as well as their political partisanship, degree of identification with 
their political party, and political polarization. Pre-screen ideology, sex, race, and SES 
were used as covariates in our analyses (see Appendix A).  
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Analyses 
 
Hypotheses were tested using two separate OLS regressions, with economic and 
social political attitudes from the main lab study serving as distinct dependent variables. 
In each regression analysis, motivation activation condition was represented by a dummy 
variable (1 = status desire condition, 0 = matched control). The relevant pre-screen 
political ideology was treated as a continuous variable—the analyses predicting economic 
political attitudes used pre-screen economic ideology, whereas the analyses predicting 
social political attitudes used pre-screen social ideology. Finally, a motivation activation 
condition x relevant pre-screen ideology interaction term was also added. Note that 
because the relevant pre-screen ideology items have a meaningful midpoint (4 = 
politically moderate), we chose not to mean-center variables in our regression analyses, 
in order to maintain ease of interpretability.  
Each analysis included a total of 6 predictors. The relevant pre-screen ideology 
covariate, sex (1 = male, 0= female or other), race (for convenience, 1 = White, 0 = non-
White), and SES were entered in the first step of a hierarchical regression. The main 
effect of the motivation activation condition was entered in the second step, and the 
motivation activation condition x relevant pre-screen ideology interaction term was 
entered in the third step.  
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CHAPTER 3 
RESULTS 
Motive Manipulation Checks 
 
The two motive activation conditions were designed to be matched on positive 
and negative affect, but not on desire to compete or desire for status. This was consistent 
with participants’ evaluations of the vignettes. Specifically, at the end of the study, when 
participants were asked to what extent (on a 9-point scale from not at all to very much ) 
they experienced a series of feelings while reading the vignette, each vignette appeared to 
elicit roughly similar amounts of negative affect (the mean of the extent to which 
participants felt “frustrated” and “angry,” (α = 0.85) (F(1, 209) = 4.08, p = 0.05, MStatus = 
1.98, MControl = 1.62) and similar amounts of positive affect (the mean of the extent to 
which participants felt “enthusiastic” and “excited,” (α = 0. 89) (F(1, 209) = 1.37, p = 
0.24, MStatus = 6.24, MControl = 5.88).  
However, the status desire vignette elicited significantly more desire to compete 
(the mean of the extent to which participants felt “competitive” and “motivated to 
compete,” (α = 0.84) (F(1, 209) = 67.77, p < .001, MStatus = 7.09, MControl = 4.72) and 
desire for status (the mean of the extent to which participants felt “desire to have higher 
social status” and “motivated to have higher prestige,” (α = 0.84) (F(1, 209) = 18.94, p 
< .001, MStatus = 6.50, MControl = 5.15) than the matched control vignette (manipulation 
check adapted from Griskevicius et al., 2009). This suggests that the two motive 
activation conditions adequately elicited the desired motivational states (see Figure 1 for 
a visual representation of the manipulation checks). 
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Economic Attitudes 
 
To test hypothesis 1, which predicted that there would be a significant main effect 
of motive activation condition on economic attitudes, whereby being in the status desire 
condition (vs. the control) would make people more economically conservative in the 
main study relative to their economic ideological stance in the prescreen, we conducted a 
hierarchical multiple regression analysis. Model 1 examined only demographic variables, 
model 2 added motivation activation condition, and model 3 added an interaction term 
between motivation activation condition and relevant pre-screen economic ideology. Our 
dependent variable in each model was the mean four-item economic attitude composite 
measure, in which higher values indicated more liberal economic attitudes (see Table 1 
for a summary of results, and Figure 2 for a simplified visualization of our results).  
The first model included only status-relevant demographic variables and the 
prescreen covariate. This model performed significantly better than a baseline model with 
no predictors (R² change = 0.31, F(4, 206) = 22.67, p < 0.001). In this model, there was a 
significant effect of pre-screen economic ideology on economic attitudes (B = 0.20, p < 
0.001). Recall that pre-screen economic ideology was coded such that higher values 
indicate more economic liberalism. Accordingly, for every one unit increase in pre-screen 
economic liberalism, there is an expected 0.20 unit increase in economic liberalism, 
controlling for other demographic variables. However, the effects of gender (B = 0.09, p 
= 0.21), race (B = - 0.03, p = 0.72, and SES (B = - 0.05, p = 0.24) on economic attitudes 
were not significant in this model. 
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The second model included motive activation condition in addition to status-
relevant demographic variables and prescreen ideology. This model did not perform 
significantly better than model 1 (R² change < 0.01, F(1, 205) = 0.55, p = 0.46). 
Motivation activation condition (B = - 0.05, p = 0.46) did not have a significant effect on 
economic attitudes in this model, although the effect was in the predicted direction. 
Finally, the third model included the interaction between motive activation 
condition and pre-screen economic ideology in addition to motivation activation 
condition and status-relevant demographic variables and prescreen ideology. This model 
did not perform significantly better than model 2 (R² change < 0.001, F(1, 204) = 0.01, p 
= 0.93). Moreover, the interaction between motivation activation condition and pre-
screen economic ideology (B < 0.01, p = 0.93) did not have a significant effect on 
economic attitudes in this model.3 
                                                 
3 Note that this pattern of results did not change considerably based on the outcome measure of economic 
attitudes that we used.  
For example, when we used self-reported economic ideology from the main study as the primary 
dependent variable, we saw higher R² values, specifically 0.65, 0.65, and 0.65, for models 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. But, again only the demographics model showed a significant R² change relative to a baseline 
model with no variable included (R² change = 0.65, F(4, 206)= 94.20, p < 0.001). Similarly, pre-screen 
economic ideology remained one of the only significant predictor (B = 0.75, p < 0.001), (B = 0.75, p < 
0.001), (B = 0.80, p < 0.001), in models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Gender was also a significant predictor in 
model 1 (B = - 0.29, p = 0.04) , model 2 (B = - 0.31, p = 0.03), and model 3 (B = - 0.32, p = 0.02), meaning 
that compared to women, men would be expected to have economic attitudes that are 0.29, 0.31, and 0.32 
units more conservative, respectively, when controlling for the other predictors in each of the three models. 
Similarly, when we used the two-item economic ideology composite (a mean of “How much 
financial assistance should the government provide to people falling below the poverty line?” and “Who 
should provide healthcare coverage?”, α = 0.58) as the primary dependent variable, we saw R² values 
similar to what we saw in the model using the 4-item composite, specifically 0.28, 0.29, and 0.29, for 
models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Again, only the demographics model had a significant R² change relative 
to a baseline model with no variable included (R² change = 0.26, F(4, 206)= 20.33, p < 0.001). Pre-screen 
economic ideology again remained one of the only significant predictors (B = 0.21, p < 0.001), (B = 0.21, p 
< 0.001), (B = 0.20, p < 0.01), in models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Family socioeconomic status was also a 
significant predictor in model 1 (B = - 0.11, p = 0.03) , model 2 (B = - 0.11, p = 0.03), and model 3 (B = - 
0.11, p = 0.03), meaning that for every one unit increase in family socioeconomic status, there is an 
expected 0.11 unit increase in economic conservativism when controlling for the other predictors in each of 
the three models. 
   20 
Social Attitudes 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicted a significant interaction between motive activation 
condition and relevant pre-screen ideology in predicting social attitudes, such that those 
in the status condition would report more extreme social attitudes relative to their social 
ideological stance in the prescreen. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis. Model 1 examined only demographic variables, model 2 
added motivation activation condition, and model 3 added an interaction term between 
motivation activation condition and relevant pre-screen social ideology. Our dependent 
variable in each model was the mean four-item social attitude composite measure, in 
which higher values indicated more liberal social attitudes (see Table 2 for a summary of 
results, and Figure 3 for a simplified visualization of our results).  
The first model included only status-relevant demographic variables and 
prescreen ideology. This model performed significantly better than a baseline model with 
no predictors (R² change = 0.26, F(4, 206) = 18.43, p < 0.001). In this model there was a 
significant effect of pre-screen social ideology on social attitudes (B = 0.25, p < 0.001). 
Recall that pre-screen social ideology was coded such that higher values indicate more 
social liberalism. Accordingly, for every one unit increase in pre-screen social liberalism, 
there is an expected 0.25 unit increase in social liberalism, controlling for other 
demographic variables. However, the effects of gender (B= 0.14, p = 0.16), race (B= 0.11, 
p = 0.25), and SES (B = 0.02, p = 0.75) on social attitudes were not significant in this 
model. 
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The second model included motive activation condition in addition to the 
variables in the first model. This model did not perform significantly better than model 1 
(R² change < 0.01, F(1, 205) = 1.17, p = 0.28). The effect of motive activation condition 
(B = 0.10, p = 0.28) on social attitudes was also not significant in this model. 
Finally, the third model included an interaction between motive activation 
condition and pre-screen social ideology in addition to motivation activation condition, 
the demographic variables, and prescreen ideology. This model did not perform 
significantly better than model 2 (R² change < 0.001, F(1, 204) = 0.01, p = 0.94). 
Moreover, the effect of the interaction between motivation activation condition and pre-







                                                 
4 Note that this pattern of results did not change considerably based on the outcome measure of social 
attitudes that we used.  
For example, when we used self-reported social ideology as the primary dependent variable, we 
saw higher R² values, specifically 0.61, 0.61, and 0.61, for models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. But, again only 
the demographics model had a significant R² change relative to a baseline model with no variable included 
(R² change = 0.61, F(4, 206) = 80.51, p < 0.001). Similarly, pre-screen social ideology remained the only 
significant predictor (B = 0.77, p < 0.001), (B = 0.77, p < 0.001), (B = 0.73, p < 0.001), in models 1, 2, and 
3, respectively.  
Similarly, when we used the two-item social ideology composite (a mean of “When should 
abortion be legal?” and “When should gay/lesbian couples be allowed to adopt children?”, α = 0.36) as the 
primary dependent variable, we saw R² values similar to what we saw in the model using the 4-item 
composite, specifically 0.27, 0.27 and 0.27, for models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Again, only the 
demographics model had a significant R² change relative to a baseline model with no variable included (R² 
change = 0.27, F(4, 206) = 18.53, p < 0.001). Pre-screen economic ideology again remained the only 
significant predictor (B = 0.26, p < 0.001), (B = 0.26, p < 0.001), (B = 0.25, p < 0.01), in models 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 4 
DISCUSSION 
In this study, we examined whether activating a motivation for status desire had 
an influence on economic and social political attitudes. Specifically, in an experimental 
paradigm in which we manipulated status desire by having participants read a vignette 
about a competitive job environment versus a closely matched control, we had two 
predictions. Our first hypothesis was that relative to the control condition, the status 
desire condition would lead both economic conservatives and economic liberals to 
endorse more politically conservative economic attitudes. Our second hypothesis was that 
relative to the control condition, the status desire condition would lead social 
conservatives and social liberals to become more extreme in their respective social 
attitudes.  
However, our results supported neither hypothesis 1 nor hypothesis 2. Specifically, 
although the relationship was in the expected direction, there was not a significant effect 
of motive activation condition on economic attitudes. Economic liberals and 
conservatives did not report significantly more conservative economic attitudes in the 
status desire activation condition relative to the control. Similarly, there was no 
significant effect of the interaction between motive activation condition and pre-screen 
social ideology on social attitudes. Social liberals and social conservatives did not appear 
to “double down” significantly on their respective social attitudes when in the status 
desire activation condition relative to the control. These findings were consistent 
regardless of how we measured economic and social attitudes (see footnotes 3 and 4). 
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Indeed, the only significant effect across our analyses was the impact of pre-screen 
economic and social ideology on main study economic and social attitudes, respectively. 
Specifically, participants who reported more liberal economic and social attitudes 
indicated slightly more liberal economic and social attitudes when surveyed 
approximately one month later in the main study.  
However, there are a few additional possibilities. One is that status desire does not 
in fact have an impact on economic or social political attitudes. Our status desire 
manipulation did appear to work as intended in the sense that it successfully elicited more 
status-relevant motivational states relative to the control, and yet, as we added motive 
activation condition-relevant variables to our models of economic and social attitudes, the 
variance explained changed by less than 0.01. This may suggest that the impact of status 
desire on economic and social attitudes is limited. 
Another possibility is that status motivation does influence political attitudes, but 
that our motive activation manipulation was insufficiently different from our control. 
Although our motive manipulation was effective insofar as the status desire condition 
elicited significantly more “desire to compete” and “desire for status”—but not more 
negative or positive affect—than the control condition, the mean differences between 
conditions were not as large as those in a previous study that used a variant of these 
manipulations in an undergraduate population (Griskevicius et al., 2009). In that study, 
which had a more competitively-worded status desire manipulation, participants in the 
status desire condition reported a mean of 6.32 and 6.42 on the same composite “desire to 
compete” and “desire for status” measures that we used, whereas participants in a control 
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condition (in which they were asked to imagine losing tickets to a concert they were 
going to with a friend), reported a mean of 2.61 and 1.95 on the “desire to compete” and 
“desire for status” measures. This reflects a mean difference of 3.71 for “desire to 
compete” and 4.47 for “desire for status” between motive conditions.  
By contrast, for our manipulations, participants in the status desire condition 
reported a mean of 7.09 and 6.50 on the composite “desire to compete” and “desire for 
status” measures, whereas participants in our closely matched control condition reported 
a mean of 4.72 and 5.15 on the same “desire to compete” and “desire for status” measures, 
reflecting a mean difference nearly half that of what Griskevicius and colleagues 
observed—2.37 for “desire to compete” and even less, 1.35, for “desire for status.” 
Notably, the mean scores of “desire to compete” and “desire for status” for our 
status desire manipulation are slightly higher than for the manipulation Griskevicius and 
colleagues used, suggesting that the weakness of our manipulations stems not from our 
less-competitively worded status desire condition, but perhaps instead from the control 
condition (which also covered the job domain). This may have elicited slightly higher 
status-relevant motivational states among our freshman participants (who likely have 
never had a serious office job) than did Griskevicius and colleagues’ control 
manipulation, which instead emphasized a different scenario— losing tickets for a 
concert with a friend. Such a story may have been effective because it focused on a 
different life domain, affiliation.  
Finally, our dependent measures may not be optimized for the sample in question. 
It is notable that our four economic and social attitude items, which were explicitly 
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designed to cover common policy issues in each domain, show somewhat suboptimal 
internal consistency (α = 0.66 for economic attitudes and α = 0.64 for social attitudes). 
This may reflect the fact that attitudes about economic and social political issues do not 
fully cohere in our sample of college freshmen, which would be consistent with political 
science literature that suggests that political attitudes do not crystallize until later in 
adulthood (e.g., Sears & Funk, 1999). It is also consistent with the relatively low 
regression coefficients between pre-screen economic ideology and the 4-item social 
economic attitude composite measure (e.g., B = 0.20 in model 1) and between pre-screen 
social ideology and the 4-item social attitude composite measure (e.g., B = 0.25 in model 
1).  
Notably, the low correspondence between pre-screen ideology and the measures 
in the main study appear to have something to do with our economic and social attitude 
composite measures in particular, rather than due to the mere passage of time between the 
pre-screen and the main study. This can be seen when we compare the correlations 
between the pre-screen ideology measures and the economic and social attitude 
composite measures in the main study to the correlations between the pre-screen ideology 
measures and the self-reported ideology measures in the main study. Whereas there is a 
high correlation between pre-screen economic ideology and self-reported economic 
ideology in the main study (r = 0.80, p < .001) and between pre-screen social ideology 
and self-reported social ideology in the main study (r = 0.78, p < .001), there is a 
somewhat lower correlation between pre-screen economic ideology and the economic 
attitude composite in the main study (r = 0.54, p < .001), and between pre-screen social 
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ideology and  the social attitude composite (r = 0.50, p < .001). This also occurs when we 
consider measures taken at the same time point. In the main study, for example, the 
correspondence between self-reported economic ideology and the economic attitude 
composite measure (r = 0.55, p < .001), and between self-reported social ideology and 
the social attitude composite measure were relatively low, which is unusual given that 
these measures should each reflect different operationalizations of the same political 
attitude constructs.  
Similarly, although the pattern of results did not change much based on the 
outcome variables that we used (see footnotes 3 and 4), models that used self-reported 
economic and social ideology as outcome measures still explained over twice as much 
variance as models that used economic and social attitude composite measures as 
outcome measures. For example, when using self-reported ideology as an outcome in 
model 1, R² was 0.65 for economic ideology and 0.61 for social ideology, whereas when 
using a composite attitude measure as an outcome in Model 1, R² was 0.31 for economic 
attitudes and 0.26 for social attitudes. In other words, our participants’ economic and 
social attitudes may be more explainable when measured in the form of an overall self-
report rather than a collection of policy issues—whereas our participants can report 
where they stand on economic and social political attitudes in the abstract, they may be 
less readily able to do so with respect to specific policy attitudes. Collectively, this 
suggests that specific policy-related economic and social attitudes may not be an 
appropriate measure in our present sample. 
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 Thus, although one of the strengths of our study was that we endeavored to have 
closely matched status desire and control conditions (thus reflecting a tight control 
condition), and that we measured specific economic and social attitudes (thus reflecting 
real policy issues), it is possible that one of the weaknesses in our present study was our 
target sample: freshman undergraduate students. Given their age, these participants may 
have experienced even our control vignette about jobs as relatively status desire-eliciting. 
This suggests a potential limitation of our design (e.g., the use of only one control group), 
particularly in the context of our undergraduate sample. Moreover, given the relative 
inconsistency in responses across our measures of political attitudes, the use of the 
specific policy-relevant issues may not have been optimal for an undergraduate sample, 
who may not yet have fully crystallized political opinions.  
Accordingly, future research should endeavor to address our hypotheses with a 
larger pool of participants in an older age range, ideally with multiple control groups. 
This will help disentangle whether the effect of status desire on economic and social 
political attitudes is indeed null, or whether it is a matter of needing a to compare its 
effects to a less closely matched control group, and/or studying it among older group of 
adults, who are more likely to have crystallized economic and social political attitudes. 
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Figure 1.  
Motive Activation Manipulation Checks: Mean Feeling Evaluations by Feeling Type and 
Motive Activation Condition.   
 
Note. Negative affect was operationalized as a mean of the extent to which participants felt “frustrated” and 
“angry,” (α = 0.85), positive affect was operationalized as a mean of the extent to which participants felt 
“enthusiastic” and “excited,” (α = 0. 89), desire to compete was operationalized as a mean of the extent to 
which participants felt “competitive” and “motivated to compete,” (α =  0.84) and desire for status was 
operationalized as a mean of the extent to which participants felt “desire to have higher social status” and 
“motivated to have higher prestige,” (α = 0.84) while reading the motivation activation vignette. Error bars 



























Model Variables B Standard 
Error of B 
Β T p R² R² 
change 
p 
1 Pre-Screen Economic Ideology 0.20 0.02 0.53 8.46*** <0.001 0.31 0.31*** <0.001 
 Gender 0.09 0.07 0.07 1.26 0.21    
 Race -0.03 0.08 -0.02 -0.36 0.72    
 SES -0.05 0.04 -0.07 -1.17 0.24    
2 Pre-Screen Economic Ideology 0.19 0.02 0.53 8.44*** <0.001 0.31 <0.01 0.46 
 Gender 0.08 0.07 0.07 1.13 0.26    
 Race -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.28 0.78    
 SES -0.05 0.04 -0.07 -1.13 0.26    
 Motive Activation Condition  -0.05 0.07 -0.04 -0.74 0.46    
3 Pre-Screen Economic Ideology 0.19 0.03 0.53 6.18*** <0.001 0.31 <0.001 0.93 
 Gender 0.08 0.07 0.07 1.13 0.26    
 Race -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.28 0.78    
 SES -0.05 0.04 -0.07 -1.12 0.26    
 Motive Activation Condition  -0.07 0.18 -0.06 -0.37 0.71    
 Pre-Screen Economic Ideology x  
Motive Activation Condition 




















Note. *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01 , ***p < 0.00
Model Variables B Standard 
Error of B 
β t p R² R² 
change 
p 
1 Pre-Screen Social Ideology 0.25 0.03 0.54 8.56*** <0.001 0.26 0.26*** <0.001 
 Gender 0.14 0.10 0.09 1.40 0.16    
 Race 0.11 0.10 0.07 1.15 0.25    
 SES 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.33 0.75    
2 Pre-Screen Social Ideology 0.25 0.03 0.54 8.61*** <0.001 0.27 <0.01 0.28 
 Gender 0.15 0.10 0.10 1.55 0.12    
 Race 0.10 0.10 0.07 1.02 0.31    
 SES 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.26 0.80    
 Motive Activation Condition  0.10 0.10 0.07 1.08 0.28    
3 Pre-Screen Social Ideology 0.25 0.04 0.53 5.85** <0.001 0.27 <0.001 0.94 
 Gender 0.15 0.10 0.10 1.55 0.12    
 Race 0.10 0.10 0.07 1.02 0.31    
 SES 0.01 0.05 0.02 0.26 0.79    
 Motive Activation Condition  0.08 0.29 0.05 0.29 0.78    
 Pre-Screen Social Ideology x  
Motive Activation Condition 
<0.01 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.94    
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Figure 2.  
Simplified Visualization of Mean Economic Attitudes by Motivation Activation Condition 
and Pre-screen Economic Ideology. 
 
Note. Here, “conservatives” were operationalized as participants who indicated in the pre-screen that they 
were either slightly, moderately, or strongly economically conservative (37.0% of our sample). “Liberals” 
were operationalized as participants who indicated in the pre-screen that they were either slightly, 
moderately, or strongly economically liberal (33.6% of our sample). Participants who indicated that they 
were economically “neutral” or moderate in the pre-screen (29.4% of our sample) were not displayed in the 
present figure, although they were included in our regression analyses, which treated pre-screen economic 
ideology as a continuous variable. Mean economic attitudes were operationalized as a mean composite of 
four economic attitude issues covering the issues of the minimum wage, tax rates for the wealthy, 
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Figure 3. 
Simplified Visualization of Mean Social Attitudes by Motivation Activation Condition and 
Pre-screen Social Ideology.  
 
 
Note. Here, “conservatives” were operationalized as participants who indicated in the pre-screen that they 
were either slightly, moderately, or strongly socially conservative (20.9% of our sample). “Liberals” were 
operationalized as participants who indicated in the pre-screen that they were either slightly, moderately, or 
strongly socially liberal (55.5% of our sample). Participants who indicated that they were socially “neutral” 
or moderate in the pre-screen (23.7% of our sample) were not displayed in the present figure, although they 
were included in our regression analyses, which treated pre-screen social ideology as a continuous variable. 
Mean social attitudes were operationalized as a mean composite of four economic attitude issues covering 
the issues of abortion, LGBT adoption rights, birth control for minors, and legalizing marijuana. Error bars 
represent 95% confidence intervals around the mean.  
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APPENDIX A  
MEASURES 
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1. Motivation Manipulations. 
 
A. Status Desire Condition (481 words): 
 
In this section, you will be asked to a scenario. Please read it carefully, as you 
will be asked questions about it later. 
 
Instructions: As you’re reading the scenario, try to put yourself in the shoes of the 
main character and experience the emotions that they are feeling. 
 
Imagine you recently graduated from college. You were offered several jobs and 
decided to go work for a well-known and powerful company. Besides paying well, 
this company offers you the greatest chance of moving up—assuming you can prove 
that you have what it takes. 
 
As you pull into the parking lot on your first day of work, you immediately notice 
that the lot is full of expensive new cars. You imagine what kind of car you might be 
able to get in the near future—perhaps a BMW or a shiny new Mustang. Entering the 
lobby, you’re impressed by how upscale everything is—the antique furniture, the 
artistic decorations, the designer clothing. 
 
As you wait, another person sits down next to you. A minute later, a third person also 
takes a seat. The two are dressed in brand new business suits and they’re about the 
same age as you. Each one briefly looks at you, smiles slightly, and says hello. Both 
of them look a little nervous and you sense that these are probably your new 
colleagues. Looking at their facial expressions and their body posture, you feel a 
sense of intensity in the air. You realize this job isn’t a game and you’re not in school 
in anymore. 
 
Your new boss finally comes out and greets everyone. As all three of you walk into 
the large corner office, everyone sits down. “You should all be very proud of 
yourselves for making it here. Our company has a sixty-year track record of being the 
best in the business because it hires and invests in the best people. You were each 
hand-selected from thousands of applicants and we’re excited to work with you to 
grow your skills.” 
 
The boss continues: “Starting today each one of you will get a small cubicle. But we 
don’t expect you to stay there. After 6 months, you will be eligible for a promotion.” 
 
“Although each of you will be eligible for promotion,” the boss goes on, “the person 
who does the best will also earn a large bonus and will be put on the fast track to 
management, where you will join some of the most accomplished people in the 
business.” You quickly scan your future colleagues. You see they are trying to show a 
confident side to your new boss. You remind yourself that you were hired for a good 
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reason and that you deserve a spot at the top. You sit up straighter and put on a 
confident expression. 
 
Pointing to the grand window offices down the hall, the boss finishes: “I see a lot of 
potential in all of you, but only one of you will earn the right to sit in one of those big 
offices. You have 6 months to show everyone what you’re made of.” You walk out of 
the office at a brisk pace, ready to get started. 
 
B. Matched Control Condition (487 words): 
 
In this section, you will be asked to a scenario. Please read it carefully, as you 
will be asked questions about it later. 
 
Instructions: As you’re reading the scenario, try to put yourself in the shoes of the 
main character and experience the emotions that they are feeling. 
Imagine you recently graduated from college. You were offered several jobs and 
decided to go work for a well-known local company. This company is the best fit for 
your skills.  
 
As you pull into the parking lot on your first day of work, you immediately notice 
that the lot is full. You drive around for a while and you see someone pull out of a 
parking spot only a few feet from the front door, leaving you the perfect place to park. 
Entering the lobby, you notice how pleasant everything is—the brightly colored 
furniture, the artistic decorations, the relaxing music.   
 
As you begin your day, you check in with human resources, where they hand you a 
thick packet of new hire paperwork. You work your way through the packet and get 
into a nice rhythm. You sign where requested and hand the completed packet back to 
the front desk. Then, one of the receptionists offers to give you a tour of the office.  
 
You’re excited to see your new workplace, and you happily agree.      
 
The receptionist starts the tour at the main conference room, where you will have 
most of your meetings. The room is nice and well-lit, with windows spilling light 
onto the wooden table. On the table there is some equipment for video conferencing 
and a projector for presentations. A few of your new colleagues walk in and greet you. 
Everyone seems nice.      
 
Next, the receptionist points you to the kitchen, which has a fridge, a coffee maker, 
and stainless steel sinks. You’re glad to see that there is ground coffee readily 
available, and you make a mental note to bring a mug into the office. You open the 
fridge, and there seems to be enough room for you to store some food—maybe a 
sandwich and some snacks.      
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Then, the receptionist shows you to the supply room, which is neatly stocked with 
staplers, pens, pencils, highlighters, notepads, and sticky notes. The receptionist 
prompts you to grab the supplies you might need, as you’ll be going to your desk next. 
You grab a black stapler, some black and red pens, some mechanical pencils, a 
notebook, and blue and yellow sticky notes. Your hands are quite full, and you’re 
relieved to learn your office is close by.  
 
You walk into your office and see a desktop computer already at your desk. You put 
down your supplies and the receptionist tells you to log into your computer using 
your first and last name. You thank the receptionist and start logging in. You spend a 
few minutes getting into the system and setting up your e-mail. Once you finish, you 
start putting away your supplies. You put the black stapler in the drawer with the pens 
and pencils. You put the notebook and sticky notes on a shelf above your computer. 
This desk is looking much more organized, and you’re feeling like you’re starting to 
settle in. 
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2. Economic Attitude Items 
 
A. Minimum Wage  
People have varying opinions on whether the minimum wage should be reduced 
or increased. Please indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion: 
The minimum wage should be ___________. 
- Reduced a lot 
- Reduced a little 
- Kept the same  
- Increased a little 
- Increased a lot  
 
B. Tax Rates for the Wealthy 
People have varying opinions about the rate at which people with high incomes 
should be taxed. Please indicate which of the following best reflects your 
opinion: 
Compared to people in other income brackets, people with high incomes should pay 
____ percentage of their income in taxes. 
- A much lower 
- A somewhat lower 
- The same  
- A somewhat higher 
- A much higher 
 
C. Government Healthcare 
People have varying opinions about the extent to which health care should be 
provided by private companies versus the government. Please indicate which of 
the following best reflects your opinion: 
Who should provide healthcare coverage?  
- Only private companies  
- Mostly private companies 
- An equal mix of private companies and government 
- Mostly the government 
- Only the government  
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D. Aid to the poor 
People have varying opinions about the extent to which the government should 
provide financial assistance to people falling below the poverty line. Please 
indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion: 
How much financial assistance should the government provide to people falling 




- A lot 
- As much as possible 
 
3. Social Attitude Items 
 
A. Abortion 
People have varying opinions about the circumstances under which abortion 
should be legal. Please indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion: 
When should abortion be legal? 
- Never 
- Only under rare circumstances 
- Under some circumstances 
- Under most circumstances 
- Always  
 
B. LGBT Adoption Rights 
People have varying opinions about the conditions under which gay/lesbian 
couples should be able to adopt children. Please indicate which of the following 
best reflects your opinion. 
When should gay/lesbian couples be allowed to adopt children? 
- Never 
- Only under rare circumstances 
- Under some circumstances 




   42 
C. Birth Control for Minors 
People have varying opinions about the circumstances under which doctors 
should be allowed to prescribe birth control to minors. Please indicate which of 
the following best reflects your opinion: 
When should doctors should be permitted to prescribe birth control to minors?   
- Never 
- Only under rare circumstances 
- Under some circumstances 
- Under most circumstances 
- Always 
 
D. Legalizing Marijuana 
People have varying opinions about the circumstances under which marijuana 
should be legal. Please indicate which of the following best reflects your opinion: 
When should the use of marijuana be legal? 
- Never 
- For rare medical conditions only 
- For any medical condition 
- For most recreational uses 
- Always 
 
4. Demographic Covariates 
 
Pre-Screen (and Main Study) 
 
A. Overall Ideology 
Which of the following best describes your overall political ideology or leaning? 
- Strongly conservative 
- Moderately conservative 
- Slightly conservative  
- Neutral (moderately) 
- Slightly liberal 
- Moderately liberal 
- Strongly liberal 
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B. Economic Attitudes 
How conservative/liberal would you consider yourself in terms of economic issues? 
- Strongly conservative 
- Moderately conservative 
- Slightly conservative  
- Neutral (moderately) 
- Slightly liberal 
- Moderately liberal 
- Strongly liberal 
 
C. Social Attitudes 
How conservative/liberal would you consider yourself in terms of social issues? 
- Strongly conservative 
- Moderately conservative 
- Slightly conservative  
- Neutral (moderately) 
- Slightly liberal 
- Moderately liberal 
- Strongly liberal 
 









- Native Hawaiian/Pacific Islander 
- American Indian 













How would you describe your family’s socioeconomic background? 
 
- Lower class 
- Working class 
- Middle class  
- Upper-middle class 
- Upper class 
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